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Abstract 
In recent time, the social dimension has gained attention at the agenda of the European Union, 
since the new Commission lead by Ursula von der Leyen put forward her political priorities, 
where one of them is to create a more social Europe. This thesis analyses the various 
explanations there are for the attitudes that the European electorate have towards a common 
European welfare scheme. It does so by analysing data from the European social survey, round 
8, in a multilevel regression. The results of the thesis indicate that the best explanation to the 
attitudes towards a European welfare scheme is that those who are in favour of European 
integration, are also more in favour of a European Union wide social benefit scheme. Other 
explanations towards the welfare is that those that define themselves as ideologically to the 
right, are also opposed to a European welfare scheme, as well as those that have a high salary. 
This in turn indicates that the attitudes that voters have towards a welfare scheme at EU level 
is mainly a question of further European integration and not a question of welfare policies.  
Keywords: Welfare, Euroscepticism, benchmarking, ideology, multilevel 
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1. Introduction  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate European voters’ attitudes towards a European Union 
benefit scheme. The debate on the social dimension has been around for a long time but it has 
recently become more relevant on the European agenda with the new Commission’s political 
goals.  
This thesis will be devoted to investigating possible explanations for the attitudes towards a 
European welfare scheme. The results of the thesis will be a good hint both to the research field 
and also to the policy makers in the EU, if it is possible to construct a supranational welfare 
state, without the mandate of the electorate?  
Furthermore, the results of the thesis will provide a good hint to the question if the construction 
of a welfare scheme at an EU-level is seen by the European electorate, as a welfare project with 
a new level of state intervention, or if it seen as another integration project at EU-level.  
The research gap that this thesis will aim to address is the lack of research that has been done 
in the field of European welfare attitudes. There is a vast field of literature that has been done 
concerning European integration attitudes, but there is no recent study that has examined 
attitudes towards a European welfare scheme, in which several EU-countries are included. This 
is the research gap that this thesis will fill.  
The background that makes this field of research relevant is that at the 17th November 2017, at 
the EU high level meeting in Gothenburg when the EU-leaders committed to the “European 
pillar of social rights”. The pillar consists of three chapters and covers 20 principles of access 
to the labour market, equal working condition and social inclusion. The third principle in the 
pillar of social rights proclaims that all European workers shall have the right appropriate wages 
and that a minimum wage shall be ensured. The social pillar itself is not a legislative document, 
but rather it is a commitment from the European leaders. This commitment however will most 
likely result in legislative proposals from the EU-Commission in the form of directives and 
regulations that will set up minimum lower boundaries within these principles that the member 
states have to follow. (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-
and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_en.)   
 
 
 5 
 
2. Research question 
The research question of this thesis will be to analyse what attitudes European citizens have 
towards welfare at a European level. The social dimension has grown over the years and has 
shifted focus during the years. For that reason, this thesis will be devoted to shift focus, from 
European integration attitudes, to European welfare attitudes. Even though the European 
Commission has no electorate mandate, it still needs to have the support of the people, in order 
to be legitimate. The Commission proposes legislations, but the European parliament and the 
Council of Ministers approves them. With that said, the Commission must have support for 
their legislation, if they don’t want a Parliament that is dominated by Eurosceptic parties and 
anti-EU governments at the negotiation table at the Council of ministers.  
The result of this thesis could be a hint to see what factors that are forming the attitudes and 
opinions that the European electorate have in the domains of welfare and social policy. It could 
be a hint to see if such a smart move by the Commission to gain more power of that same policy 
domain. The research question of this thesis is therefore: What are the explanations to the 
attitudes that European voters have towards a European social benefit scheme? 
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3. Disposition 
The disposition of this thesis will be a first chapter with the background of EU and the social 
dimension of the European Union. Thereafter there will be a chapter containing the previous 
research, including the theoretical framework that the thesis is built up around. The chapter 
ends with a conclusion of the previous research and various hypothesises that can be drawn 
from it. Chapter 6 goes through the method that is used to answer the research question. This 
chapter includes reasoning about the choice of the method, presentation of the data and the 
operationalisation of the variables. Furthermore, the chapter ends with a section that goes 
through the analytical strategy of the method. The result chapter is devoted to show the results 
of the thesis and confirm or reject the hypothesises. The analysis chapter will connect the results 
to the research question and relate them to the previous research. The thesis ends with the 
conclusion chapter.  
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4. Background 
In July 2019, the European Commission’s president elect at the time, Ursula von der Leyen, 
published her political guidelines for her Commission for the period 2019 – 2024. Her political 
priorities consist of six pillars and the second pillar is called “An economy that works for 
people”. In this pillar she proposes several policies to set up welfare schemes at a European 
Union level. Von der Leyen wrote that her Commission will propose an Action plan to fully 
implement the European pillar of social rights. In the first hundred days of her Commission she 
will propose legislative measures that will provide every worker in the EU with a decent 
minimum wage. Furthermore, she states that the Commission will put forward a European 
unemployment benefit reinsurance scheme. The new Commission will seek to make the 
member states to fully implement the Work-life balance directive with the aim that both parents 
shall share the care taking responsibility for their infants. These initiatives will be supported 
with investments from the new fund European social fund.  
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-
commission_en.pdf. Pp. 8 - 10) 
The European Union in its constitution is a mix of a supranational and intergovernmental 
structure. The European Commission, which is the institution with the sole right to propose 
legislature, is not an elected body. Rather, it is composed by the nomination of one 
commissioner from each member state, and the responsibilities is proposed by the prospected 
head of the Commission, and finally it has to be approved by the European Parliament and the 
European Council. Even though that the Commission has no direct electorate mandate, it is still 
vital to include the opinion of the electorate. The European Parliament, which is elected by the 
people from the member states, which is one of the two legislative bodies, is also the institution 
that approves and controls the Commission. A Commission that does not have the mandate of 
the voters’, will soon lose its mandate from the parliament.  
The evolution of the European Union has changed radically over the years, and also which 
institution that does what. The predecessor to the European Union was the European coal and 
steel community (ECSC) that was initiated by the original six countries: Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy and West Germany. According to Linda Hantrais who 
wrote the book Social policy in the European Union says that the road to wealth was meant to 
be through free trade and the free movement of people, capital, services and goods would make 
the countries in the community rich. The reason that social policy and social security was not 
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emphasised in the initiation of the community was because the six countries already had a 
somewhat similar economy. What happened during the following years was that the European 
Community as it was called after 1958 following the Rome treaty, faced a series of 
enlargements and the countries that joined during the 70s and the 80s were countries that did 
not have the same wealthy economy as the original six. In the 80s the social dimension of the 
European community started to form. (Hantrais, 1995, Pp. 1 – 2, 6 – 8) 
The social dimension has since the 1980s been demonstrated through the European Union’s 
cohesion policy. The cohesion policy has had the objective of converging the union’s welfare 
and economic performance in order to avoid social dumping and make sure that every region 
benefits from taking part in the EU. Even though the program period of 2014 – 2020 is coming 
to an end but it is important to start there to see what the cohesion policy and the social 
dimension is really about. For the mentioned period, the cohesion policy has a budget of 351.8 
billion EUR which is almost a third of the total EU expenditure during the same period. The 
cohesion policy during this period was divided through three main funds; The European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which is a fund for supporting growth, the Cohesion Fund 
which is for supporting green growth in regions where there are few incentives for such 
investments and finally the European Social Fund (ESF) which is allocated for regions with 
lower economic and wealth performance than others. The cohesion policy for the period 2014 
– 2020 is divided into 11 thematic goals. Goal 8 – 11 aim at supporting social inclusion, 
employability, education and efficient public administration.  
(https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/basic/basic_2014_en.pdf, Pp. 3 – 
4)  
As mentioned above the new Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has big ambitions in 
creating a more social Europe. To make that happen there are two main instruments, one is to 
legislate common European welfare standards by directives and regulations or by creating 
European welfare schemes at an EU level. The latter will demand resources from the budget. 
The issue during the fall of 2019 and before that has been that the new budget proposal from 
the Commission has been 1,14% of the EU-27:s common GNI, which in turn is an increase of 
expenditures for countries like Sweden and Germany. The latest meeting in the European 
council did not reach an agreement even though the Finnish presidency had proposed a revised 
budget proposition where the budget only represented 1,07 of the common EU-27 GNI. 
(https://cpmr.org/wpdm-package/cpmr-analysis-of-the-mff-negotiating-box-december-
2019/?wpdmdl=23869&refresh=5e660ab5269171583745717&ind=1575469332697, Pp. 2) 
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With that said and the controversy that goes around the EU-spending and the ambitions to create 
a more social dimension on EU-level, this thesis’s aim is to investigates the public attitudes 
toward the social dimension of the European Union in the meaning, the attitudes toward a 
common European welfare scheme.  
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5. Previous research and theory 
The following chapter goes through the previous research and the theoretical framework of 
European attitudes towards welfare and European integration. The sections containing the 
previous research is important to get an overlapping picture of the factors that are forming the 
attitudes toward a European welfare scheme. The view of a welfare scheme at EU-level is 
somewhat two folded. Either it can be seen as purely a question of welfare measures, or it can 
be seen as another European integration project. The previous research disentangles the possible 
explanations and what we do and do not know about welfare attitudes, self-interest, ideology 
and Euroscepticism.  
5.1. Research concerning attitudes to EU welfare policies 
This field of research is important in order to understand the possible explanation of welfare 
attitudes and how they might be determinant for the opinions towards a European welfare 
scheme.  
When it comes to attitudes towards European integration, one author that has contributed is 
Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, who wrote an article in in 2000 where he found that people who have 
low confidence in their national institutions will in turn have more confidence for EU and 
European integration, if they also have high confidence in the EU-institutions. (Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2000, Pp. 148 – 156). When considering different welfare regimes, Brian Burgoon 
found in his study from 2009 that when the attitudes are measured from a country perspective, 
those citizens from countries with a generous welfare only at a modest level are opposed to a 
European Union welfare scheme (Burgoon, 2009, Pp. 435, 450 – 451).  
A study that contradicts these two was made by Laurie Beaudonnet in 2015, in which she 
concluded that those citizens that are from a country with a generous welfare are indeed more 
opposed toward a European welfare scheme and the reason is mainly due to the fact that in a 
multilevel system, those who are from countries with generous welfare systems will feel like 
their national system is threatened by EU. There is also the blaming aspect in which the 
perceived welfare is relevant. Beaudonnet says that those who perceive their welfare as bad will 
in turn be more opposed to European integration. (Beaudonnet, 2015, Pp. 468 – 469). Adam 
William Chalmers and Lisa Maria Dellmuth found in their study from 2015 that there indeed is 
a great difference between countries in the EU, but that the relationship is conditioned by 
education, those who have more education are more positive towards European integration. 
(Chalmers and Dellmuth, 2015, Pp. 25 – 26)  
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When it comes to blaming the EU for the national performance, Staffan Kumlin found in his 
article from 2009 that voters who have low confidence in their national welfare also have lower 
trust in the EU. (Kumlin, 2009, Pp 417 – 418). This relationship was also found in a study from 
2019 where the Belgian electorate and their attitudes toward Social Europe was investigated. It 
was found that those with low trust in the national welfare also are opposed social Europe. 
Interestingly they found that pensioners and students are more in favour of Social Europe than 
blue collar workers. (Baute, Meuleman and Abts, 2019, Pp. 16) 
The theory of having the national welfare as a reference is called benchmarking. According to 
the authors Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson, the concept of benchmarking reached European 
politics in the mid-90s when the Commission came up with the communication Benchmarking 
the competitiveness of the European industry. (Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson, 2004, Pp. 
315)  
Catherine de Vries develops the concept when she analyses the roots of Euroscepticism and 
says that the European electorate benchmark EU:s performance in various aspects and the 
reference that they measure it against is their own national performance. When people perceive 
the benefits for their own country, meaning that the membership in the European Union creates 
an added value, the support for the membership is high, but in turn, when the perception is that 
the there is a loss in some way for their member states, the support for remaining a member 
decreases. (de Vries, 2018, Pp. 35 – 43) 
When it comes to electoral attitudes, one important aspect to include is economic voting. One 
author who have contributed much in this field of research is Michel S. Lewis-beck. According 
to him, the economic vote means a great deal in the electoral outcomes in terms of reward or 
punishment. The incumbent party is rewarded when the economy is doing good and likewise 
punished when the economy is doing bad. (Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo, 2019, Pp. 14). (Lewis 
– Beck, Nadeau and Belanger, 2012, Pp. 564 – 565).  
When looking deeper into economic voting, Lewis – Beck together with Mary Stegmeier wrote 
a study in which they wanted to see in what way and how strong the economic factors of the 
voting turn out is. They found, when looking at different countries that voters in general judge 
their national economic performance based on different variables, they can for example be 
unemployment, growth or inflation for example (Lewis – Beck and Stegmeier, 2000, 211 – 213) 
Lewis Beck also found support that the electorate do judge the economic in a correct way, when 
they judge the economy. (Lewis – Beck, 2006, Pp. 210 – 211) 
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Can there be drawn any conclusions from economic voting at a European level? The issue is 
that voters in general as previous research have shown, have a good perception of the country’s 
economy but taking it to an EU-level, the domains of different policies are somewhat blurry. It 
is not obvious to many people what the domains of the EU-institutions actually are and the 
authors Monika Bartowska and Guido Tiemann wanted to examine just that: What happens to 
the perspective of economic voting at an EU-level. They found that the theory of reward – 
punishment still stood strong even in a European election, but with the difference that the 
electorate use their vote and benchmark against the economic situation in their own country. 
Since voters vote for national parties in the European parliament election, they also reward and 
punish their national parties in those elections. If the incumbent party in one country where the 
perception of the economy is bad, they will in turn be punished in the election to the European 
parliament, and vice versa. (Bartowska and Tiemann, 2015, Pp. 214 – 215)  
Taking this field of research together, there are reasons to believe that those that are satisfied 
with their national welfare, will most likely be less positive to a welfare scheme at an EU-level.  
5.2. Previous research concerning personal resources towards European integration 
This field of research is important to understand since it will be important to see if self-interest 
has a strong relationship with the attitudes concerning a common European welfare scheme.  
The egocentric-utilitarian field of research is more concerned with how individuals feel that 
they have gained or lost from being members in the EU. What previous researchers like 
Matthew Gabe and Harvey D. Palmer have concluded is that people in general think more about 
individual costs and benefits when they are forming their opinions and attitudes towards EU. 
They say that even though the country as a whole might benefit from the EU, people that are 
unprivileged in terms of education, income and employment will consider EU as an elite project 
and for that reason be more sceptic towards further integration. (Gabel and Palmer, 1995, Pp. 
4, 12 – 13) Matthew Gabel further explored the utilitarianist aspect in a study from 1998 where 
he tested several explanations for attitudes towards European integration, in which he 
concluded that the utilitarian explanation is strongest. Those who do not directly benefit from 
the EU will be less positive towards further integration. (Gabel, 1995, Pp. 351 – 352)  
Lauren MacLaren further explores the relationship with the utilitarian explanation for 
Euroscepticism. She supports the findings of the previous authors and says that there indeed is 
a very strong relationship between the egocentric utilitarian variables and the attitudes toward 
European integration. (MacLaren, 2005, Pp. 7 – 8) Another article from the same time, written 
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by Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers support the same these as MacLaren and the previous 
authors in which they conclude the people who perceive that the costs of EU membership is 
greater than the wins, will be more opposed towards European integration. They however add 
another feature in the meaning that they investigate what people perceive in terms of costs and 
benefits for their country, and not just for themselves. (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005, Pp. 227, 
228) 
This previous research makes it reasonable to believe that there is a relationship between self-
interest and the attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. It is reasonable to 
believe that those who are well off, in terms of education, income and employment will be more 
positive towards a common European welfare scheme.   
5.3. Research concerning Euroscepticism 
This field of research is relevant since much of the previous deals with European integration as 
a dependent variable, and therefore it is important to see if Euroscepticism is determinant for 
the attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme.  
In 1996, Christopher J Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert wrote an article in which they wanted 
to investigate the support of European integration with a cost/benefit analysis. They had two 
types of benefit definitions, direct and indirect benefits. The definition of indirect benefits was 
an assumption that they used from looking at trade liberties and assumed that a more liberal 
market would provide benefits to those with already high income, high education and a well 
payed off job would be the ones that would benefit from EU trade liberalizations. They find 
that there are great similarities within the measured countries. They find that the indirect 
benefits have a far stronger relationship in determining the support for further integration, while 
the direct benefits do not appear to have a strong relationship. They also say that this is a 
complement to what is already known that national politics have a huge impact on how citizens 
see the project of European integration. (Anderson and Shawn Reichert, 1996, Pp. 238 – 239, 
244 – 247)  
Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks wrote an article in 2005 where they investigated the different 
explanations for Euroscepticism. In their articles they started by summarizing previous research 
and one of their hypotheses was that people or citizens from countries that are net contributors 
would be less in favour of further European integration than citizens from countries that net 
receivers. Furthermore, they discuss the integration from the aspect of the political 
prerequisites. Like previous writers have concluded, Hooghe and Marks find it reasonable to 
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believe that the perception of the domestic political situation will have an effect on how they 
see further European integration. They say that the left – right dimension could be taken into 
account and they mean since the EU is a multilevel system of governance, they benchmark the 
EU, based on the domestic national economic situation. For example they say that citizens from 
countries with a social democratic economic regime will probably be opposed to further 
European integration, since it for them will mean a competitor of governance and a risk to their 
economic system, and likewise, those that are from countries and who do not have a high 
confidence in the national economic institutions will be more positive towards European 
integration. (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, Pp. 421, 427, 431, 436 – 438) Hooghe and Marks also 
say that the type of Euroscepticism in the meaning that the EU is perceived as a cultural threat 
is a rather new phenomenon. (Hooghe, Lisbet., Marks, Gary., (2007), Acta Politica, Pp. 119 – 
122) 
In a research review written by Matthew Loveless and Robert Rohrschneider they go through 
some of the arguments that previously had been put forward. In the section about economic 
factors as determinants for Euroscepticism they discuss the work that has been done by Lewis 
Beck in the 90s and 80s.  He concluded that there was a weak relationship between objective 
economic factors such as GPD, unemployment and information and European integration. 
Rather there is a strong relationship between subjective economic and demographic factors and 
European integration, such as income, education, unemployed. This in turn gave birth to the 
term economic self-interests and egocentric utilitarianism.  (Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011, 
Pp. 9 – 10)  
The author Cécile Laconte makes which is important to understand the term Euroscepticism is 
that is not a term with a red thread, in the meaning that is not an ideology or a political 
philosophy. She relates the term with another similarly problematic term, populism, which is 
not an ideology or a set of ideas presenting a comprehensive worldview. Euroscepticism is 
rather a term of being sceptic toward something or anti something. For that reason, it is 
important to further look at the term scepticism, which Leconte describes in the book. The term 
scepticism is originated from the ancient Greece and the core of the philosophy is that it does 
not accept an opinion or a worldview without first freely and critically examining it. With that 
said Euroscepticism as we know it today has developed to be two things: against EU as a 
political project and critical toward further European integration. The opposition towards EU 
and European integration is referred to as “hard Euroscepticism” and the opinion to reform the 
EU and being critical to further European integration is referred to “soft Euroscepticism”. The 
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conclusion is that Euroscepticism is not necessary against EU, but rather critical towards EU. 
(Leconte, 2010, Pp. 5 – 6) 
They say that the soft Euroscepticism, meaning being willing to reform the union has been 
around for the longest. Since the EU has moved to be Ideology will a more political project 
rather than just an economic project, the hard Euroscepticism, manifested in the fact that the 
EU is perceived as a cultural threat is a rather new phenomenon. (Hooghe, Lisbet., Marks, 
Gary., (2007) Acta Politica, Pp. 119 – 122) 
The conclusion of this chapter is that those that are Eurosceptic will also be negative towards a 
common European welfare scheme.  
5.4. Research concerning ideology 
Ideology is one aspect that is important for this thesis. The purpose of this section is to see if 
ideology is determinant for the opinions towards welfare attitudes.  
Stefan Svallfors has made contribution to the field of research in terms welfare attitudes in 
different countries depending on the type of welfare regime that the country belongs to. The 
liberal welfare regime has a very individualistic approach, where the welfare system is not very 
generous. Welfare subsidies are supposed support only those that are in need of subsistence. 
The social democratic welfare regime has a very generous welfare redistribution and the 
continental regime has a well built out welfare system but is redistributed through collectives 
and not individuals. In the article, Svallfors wants to examine how class is determinant for the 
attitudes towards the welfare state, in Sweden. Svallfors compares Sweden to its very similar 
neighbour Norway and his conclusion is that Norway does not have the same class cleavages 
as Sweden, probably due to the fact that the Norwegian right wing has not been as 
straightforward as in Sweden. (Svallfors, 2004, 131-132) 
In an article from 2003, Svallfors made a study on eight different countries, which belong to 
different welfare regimes. He confirmed the findings that he made in the Swedish case, where 
he once again compares Sweden and Norway. He found that class cleavages are very strong in 
Sweden, as they also are countries like the United Kingdom and United States. In these latter 
countries, with a very market based, or liberal approach to welfare, the cleavages of class is 
rather an effect of actual living conditions. Sweden on the other hand, with a very generous 
welfare is a result of what he describe as ideological articulation, meaning that organisations, 
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political parties and other interest groups have had ideological agenda when creating the welfare 
state, as have the political opposition, the right wing, in Sweden. (Svallfors, 2003, 515 – 516) 
The conclusion of this section is that those that define themselves as ideologically right, will be 
negative towards a European welfare scheme.  
5.5. Conclusion and hypothesises  
The previous research has gone through four main explanations for explaining the attitudes 
towards a European social benefit scheme. Even though there are not that much research that 
has been made on the attitudes towards a European social benefit scheme, the previous research 
has rather focused on European integration.  
From the previous research and the theories, there will be four hypothesis that will be 
investigated in this thesis. The conclusions that can be drawn from the previous research and 
the theories is that those that are satisfied with their national welfare will also be more negative 
towards a common European welfare scheme.  
Another conclusion that can be drawn, at least when looking at the previous research is that 
personal resources will be a strong factor. Personal resources in this case means egocentric 
utilitarianism, and according to the research that has been made on European integration, is that 
those with high education, high salary and that have job, will be more positive towards 
European integration. It is therefore reasonable to believe that they will also be more positive 
towards a European welfare scheme.  
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the previous research is that there will be great 
variance among different countries, concerning the attitudes towards a European Union welfare 
scheme.  
From the previous research about European integration and Euroscepticism, it is reasonable to 
believe that those that have Eurosceptic opinions will be negative towards a European welfare 
scheme.  
As Stefan Svallfors has shown in his previous research, those that define themselves as 
ideologically right will be negative towards a common European welfare scheme, since being 
politically right is associated with less support for welfare and state interventions.  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a negative relationship with having a good perception of the 
national welfare and being in favour of a European social benefit scheme.  
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Hypothesis 2: There will be a positive relationship with scoring high on certain demographic 
variables and being in favour of a European welfare scheme, in the meaning that those that have 
a high salary, high education and that are working will be more in favour of a European welfare 
scheme.  
Hypothesis 3: There will be a negative relationship between being ideologically to the right 
and being in favour of a European welfare scheme.  
Hypothesis 4: There will be a positive relationship with being in favour of European integration 
being in favour of a European welfare scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
6. Method 
The method that will be used for this thesis is a multilevel regression design. The aim of the 
thesis is to analyse different explanations for the European voters’ attitudes towards a common 
European welfare scheme. Since there is a large number of observations that are going to be 
included, a quantitative regression method is the most suitable.  
The four hypothesises that will be tested in this thesis are; If those that are satisfied with their 
national welfare are also less in favour of a common European welfare scheme, if those that 
have high education, high salary and have a job, are in favour of a common European welfare 
scheme, if those with Eurosceptic opinions are less in favour of a common European welfare 
scheme and last, if those that place themselves on the right side of the ideology left – right scale 
are less in favour of a common European welfare scheme.  
The dataset that is going to be used to answer the research question is the European social 
survey round 8, from 2016. The European social survey is an academically driven cross-
national survey, that every second year collects data in several areas. The ESS has been going 
since 2001, and the data is collected by face-to-face interviews.  
6.1. Data and variables 
When using ESS, the data should be weighted. There are two types of weights that should be 
included when working with ESS. The two weights takes into consideration that each individual 
have not had the same opportunity to answer the question due to different opportunities for 
different countries and the second weight takes into consideration that there are different 
number of respondents from different countries. (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, (2017), Pp. 221 – 
222)  
The 16 countries that will be included in this this thesis are the ones that are members in the 
European Union except Estonia. The countries are as follows: Austria, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Czechia, Finland, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Italy and Ireland.  The countries that have been recoded away are: 
Switzerland, Estonia, United Kingdom, Israel, Iceland, Norway and Russia.  
The dependent variable for this thesis is a variable that asks people if they are in favour of a 
common European welfare scheme. The variable and the prerequisites are as follows: The 
dependent variable for this thesis is a question that asks if the respondent is in favour or not in 
favour of a European social benefit scheme. The prerequisite for the question is as follows:  
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“It has been proposed that there should be a European Union-wide social benefit scheme for all 
poor people. In a moment I will ask you to tell me whether you are against or in favour of this 
scheme. First, look at the highlighted box at the top of this card, which shows the main features 
of the scheme. A European Union-wide social benefit scheme includes all of the following: 
…READ OUT…  
 The purpose is to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all poor people in the European 
Union.  
 The level of social benefit people receive will be adjusted to reflect the cost of living in their 
country.  
 The scheme would require richer European Union countries to pay more into such a scheme 
than poorer European Union countries.”  
This variable is an ordinal scale variable and it has four possible answers: Strongly against, 
against, in favour and strongly in favour. In the ESS dataset, the variable is coded “eusclbf” and 
in the design of this thesis it will be labelled “EU-benefit scheme” 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaire
s.pdf, Pp. 49) 
6.1.1. Hypothesis 1. Welfare index 
To test the hypothesis that those who are satisfied with their national welfare are also more 
negative towards a common European welfare scheme, there will be an index that measures 
how satisfied people are with their national welfare. The index is constructed by five variables, 
which are: “please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country] 
nowadays?” (stfedu), “what do you think overall about the standard of living of pensioners?” 
(slvpens), “What do you think overall about the standard of living of people who are 
unemployed?” (slvuemp), “please say what you think overall about the state of health services 
in [country] nowadays?” (stfhlth) and “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present 
state of the economy in [country]?” (stfeco). These variables are interval scale variables that 
ranges from 0 to 10. 0 is equal to “not satisfied at all” and 10 is equal to “very satisfied”. The 
index that is going to be used will have a range from 1 to 10, where 1 will be equal to “not 
satisfied at all” and 10 will be equal to “very satisfied”. The answers coded as zero will be 
coded away, to make the index symmetric. Since the index ranges from 1 – 50, it will be recoded 
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so that 1 – 5 = 1, 6 – 10 = 2, 11 – 15 = 3, 16 – 20 = 4, 21 – 25 = 5, 26 – 30 = 6, 31 – 35 = 7, 36 
– 40 = 8, 41 – 45 = 9 and 46 – 50 = 10. 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaires.pdf. Pp. 
12, 13, 39) 
 
To confirm if the index measures what it is supposed to, namely the satisfaction with the 
national welfare, the correlation is tested to see if they are related. Furthermore, the cronbachs 
alpha is used when doing a multivariate correlation test. The cronbachs alpha value is supposed 
to be 0,7 or above. The value that is obtained when correlating these five variables is 0,74, 
which indicates that the variables are related, and the construction of the index is appropriate.  
 
6.1.2. Hypothesis 2. Personal resources/ egocentric utilitarianism 
The second hypothesis is that those with high education, high salary and those that have a job, 
will be more in favour of a common European welfare scheme. This hypothesis is made with 
regard to the previous research, which show clearly that those factors that was just mentioned, 
make people more in favour of European integration.  
The variables that are going to be used for this hypothesis are: Education, income and 
unemployment. In this thesis, these variables and this factor will be called personal resources, 
which is a term, used by previous researchers when discussing the same variables.  
The first variable in this cluster is education. In the ESS-dataset, education is coded into seven 
categories, which range from less than lower secondary education to higher tertiary education. 
For the purpose of this thesis, these seven categories will be recoded into a dummy variable, 
with three categories that is supposed to catch low education, medium education and high 
education. The variable is coded eisced in the ESS-dataset. The variable lower education 
includes the categories less than lower secondary education and lower secondary education. 
The variable medium education includes lower tier upper secondary education, upper tier 
secondary education and advanced vocational sub-d education and the variable high education 
includes lower tertiary education and higher tertiary education. In the ESS-dataset, the question 
of the education variable is: “What is the highest level of education you have successfully 
completed?”  
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaires.pdf. Pp. 
57) 
The second variable in this cluster is income. Income in this dataset is measured in deciles, 
ranging from 0 to 10. In the dataset, the variable is coded hinctnta. The question in the ESS is: 
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“Which letter describes your household’s total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, 
from all sources?” 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaires.pdf. Pp. 
66) 
The third variable is unemployment. The question in the ESS is: “which of these descriptions 
applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days?” In the dataset, this variable is already 
prepared and those to factors that are going to be used are those who are unemployed and 
actively looking for a job, and those that are unemployed and not actively looking for a job. In 
this thesis, the variable will be a dichotomous variable, where 0 is equal to employed and 1 is 
equal to unemployed. The two variables that measure two different forms of unemployment 
will be merged into one.  
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaires.pdf. Pp. 
66) 
 
6.1.3. Hypothesis 3. Ideology 
The third hypothesis is that those who identify themselves as right on the pollical left -right 
scale, will be more negative towards a common European welfare scheme. In ESS, the question 
is as follows: “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, where 
would you place yourself on this scale” This variable ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 is left and 
10 is right. To make this variable more operationalizable, it will be recoded into a dummy 
variable, consisted of the categories left, middle and right. The dummy variable ideologically 
left consists of the answers between 0 – 3 and is coded as 1. The dummy variable ideologically 
middle consists of the answers between 4 – 6 and is coded as 2. The dummy variable 
ideologically right consists of the answers between 7 – 10 and is coded as 3.  
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaires.pdf. Pp. 
11) 
 
6.1.4. Hypothesis 4. European integration 
The fourth hypothesis is that those who are in favour of European integration will also be in 
favour of a common European welfare scheme. There is one variable that measure the attitudes 
towards European integration. The question is as follows: “Now thinking about the European 
Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too 
far.” This variable ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 is equal to the opinion that European unification 
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has already gone too far and 10 is equal to having the opinion that European unification should 
go further.  
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaires.pdf. Pp. 
14) 
 
6.1.5. Control variables 
The control variables that will be included in this thesis are gender age.  
Gender is a dichotomous variable and age is a continuous variable.  
 
All of the variables will be coded so that the answers “refusal”, “don’t know” and “non-
answers” will be recoded away.  
 
6.2. Validity 
It is important to discuss the validity of the variables. Starting with the variables that were 
recoded into the welfare index it can be said that the validity overall is good. The five variables 
measured the satisfaction with health care, education, standard for the unemployed and the 
pensioners and the state of the economy. These five variables measure in a broad way, most of 
the aspect that are related to the welfare, which is also the purpose. However, one obvious 
problem with these variables which measure satisfaction is that the welfare and the state of the 
economy is not static. These variables tell us how satisfied people were with these policy areas 
in the year of 2016. If there would have been a financial crash in 2017, which in turn put 
pressure on the government to impose austerity in the public sectors, like in Greece and Latvia, 
the answers would probably not have been the same in 2020 as they were in 2016. This however 
is rather a problem with reliability. The validity for these variables is they measure what they 
are supposed to, for the purpose of this thesis.  
Turning to the variables that measure egocentric utilitarianism, or self-interest, the validity of 
the variables is good. They measure in a good way the level of education and the level of 
income. The variable that measure unemployment is however somewhat problematic. The issue 
here is that we do not know what type of employment those that have one have. Do they have 
a part time job, hours-contract, full time monthly contract?  
Turning to the variable that measure ideology. This variables validity is somewhat problematic. 
What do the questioner and the respondent actually mean with left or right. Are they talking 
about the economic dimension or the value dimension?  
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The validity of the Euroscepticism variables is both good and bad. The dichotomous variables 
that measure if the respondent would want their country to secede from the EU has good 
validity, it measures what it intends to measure. The variable that asks the respondent about 
what they think about European unification is some what problematic. What is meant by 
“unification” Does it mean economic unification or political unification?  
6.3. Analytical strategy 
The strategy is to test these hypothesises will be to test each hypothesis individually, and then 
have a model where all variables for the hypothesises are tested all together. Each model will 
first be tested without and then with control variables.  
The method of this thesis is to do a multilevel regression. The purpose of the design is that there 
are reasons to believe that the answers are nested at level 2. Level 2 is countries. Level 1 is the 
individual observations. In other words, there reasons to believe that the answers depend on 
which country that the respondents are from.  
In order to find out if multilevel as a design fits the purpose best, the first thing that will be 
tested is the variance, to see if the answers are nested at a country level. According to 
Mehmetoglu and Jacobsen, the limit of the variance, the so called variance partition coefficient 
that tests the variance and to what degree the variables are nested at a country level.  If the 
variance partition coefficient is higher than 5%, then it is appropriate to move on with a 
multilevel regression, otherwise a OLS-regression with the level two clustered should be used, 
since there is still reasonable to believe that the variables are nested at level two. (Mehmetoglu 
and Jakobsen, 2017, Pp. 203) 
The variance partition coefficient Is calculated with the following formula: Level 2 / (level 2 + 
level 1). These two variances can be found by doing a multilevel intercept only model, meaning 
a model with only the dependent variable. In this thesis, the level 2 variance is 0.066941 and 
the level 1 variance is 0.5196628. Adding them together we get a variance of 0.066941 + 
0.5196628 = 0.5866038 and the VPC then is 0.066941/0.586628 = 0.1141114983. The VPC 
we get when running an intercept only model is 11,4%, and for that reason this thesis will 
continue with a multilevel regression. Both the simple OLS and the OLS where the country 
variable is clustered will be presented in the appendix.  
After having found out that multilevel is a better design than an ordinary least squares with the 
countries clustered, the methodology will be as follows: First there will be an ordinary least 
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squares design, both with and without the countries clustered. In this design all the variables 
(which I will present in the next section) will be included. The full model will be: mixed eusclbf 
index edudum2 edudum3 hinctnta unemployed lrdum3 member2 euftf gender2 agea age2 || 
country:, ml variance. Doing the full model from the beginning will let me know how many 
individuals that will be excluded, since the same respondents have to be present in every 
variable.  
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7. Results 
The research question of this thesis is to investigate and analyse different explanations that 
European voters’ have towards a common European welfare scheme. The table below shows 
the result from the multilevel regression, where each hypothesis is tested individually. The first 
hypothesis was there is a negative relationship with being in favour of a European Union benefit 
scheme and also being satisfied with the national welfare. The second hypothesis is that those 
with high education, high salary and that have a job, will be more positive towards a welfare 
scheme. The third hypothesis is that those who are more positive towards European integration 
are also positive towards a European social benefit scheme and the fourth and last hypothesis 
is that those who place themselves to the right at the ideological scale, are more negative 
towards a European welfare scheme. The results are presented in table 1. This table shows the 
results of the four hypothesises when they are tested independently, along with the last model, 
which tests the variables all together. 
Table 1. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is if the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from a 
multilevel OLS regression.  
 
Multilevel Regression with the four hypothesises, tested independently and all together 
   EU social benefit scheme 
 Welfare index Egocentric utilitarianism Left - right Euroscepticism Full model 
 M. 1 M. 2 M. 1 M. 2 M. 1 M. 2 M. 1 M. 2 M. 1 
Index -.006 
(.008) 
-.007 
(.008) 
      -.017 
(.009) 
Medium 
education 
  -.010 
(.02) 
-.009 
(.02) 
    -.018 
(.019) 
High education   -.013 
(.032) 
-.013 
(.030) 
    -.055* 
(.027) 
Income   -.011* 
(.005) 
-.011* 
(.004) 
    -.011* 
(.005) 
Unemployment   .06* 
(.029) 
.056* 
(.028) 
    .052 
(.031) 
Ideologically 
right 
    -
.160**
* 
(.036) 
-.159*** 
(.036) 
  -.137*** 
(.034) 
 
EU-member       .117*** 
(.028) 
.114*** 
(.028) 
.135*** 
(.024) 
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European 
unification 
      .032** 
(.01) 
.032** 
(.01) 
.033** 
(.01) 
Gender  .032 
(.017) 
 .029* 
(.014) 
 .025 
(.015) 
 .03 
(.015) 
.017 
(.013) 
Age  -.007* 
(.003) 
 -.005 
(.003) 
 -.007* 
(.003) 
 -.004 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.003) 
Age Squared  .000* 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
 .000* 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
Intercept 2.769*** 
(.091) 
2.921*** 
(.097) 
2.808*** 
(.058) 
2.924*** 
(.065) 
2.779*
** 
(.06) 
2.92*** 
(.073) 
2.475*** 
(.111) 
2.563*** 
(.117) 
2.732*** 
(.103) 
N. Observations 18 762 18 762 18 762 18 762 18 762 18 762 18 762 18 762 18 762 
N. Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels*<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001. The standard error is in parenthesis. The 
data is weighted, and the countries are clustered into a multilevel model, with regard to the fact that the answers 
is nested at level-2 (country level). The reference country in this table is Austria.  
Starting with the welfare index. The welfare index was constructed as an index that measures 
how satisfied people are with the state of health services, state of education, the standard of 
pensioners, standard for the unemployed and the state of the economy. Those variables measure 
each individual’s attitudes to its own country’s welfare. Now, looking at the index we can see 
that it has a very small negative effect, and insignificant. For that reason, there are no 
conclusions that can be drawn from that single model. The result stays the same when including 
the three control variables.  
Moving on to the variable cluster of personal resources. In this thesis, these three variables are 
included together. From the two models we can see that the two dummy variables for medium- 
and high education show a low effect and also an insignificant result. Looking at the income 
variable, in model 3 and 4, the variable shows an effect of -0.011, respectively. This effect is 
significant, which means that the higher income you have, the less positive you are towards a 
European welfare scheme. This effect is not changed when it is included in the large model 
with the other variables (-0.011). Now moving on to the last variable in the egocentric 
utilitarianist cluster, unemployment, which has a modest effect (0.06). this effect is modest 
since it is a dichotomous variable, and still shows such a low effect, which indicate that there 
is a connection, though not a strong one, between being unemployed and being positive towards 
a EU welfare scheme.  
Moving on to the ideology variable, it can be seen that there is a very strong negative effect 
with being ideologically to the right and the attitudes towards a European social benefit scheme 
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(-0.160). This supports the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship with being 
ideologically right wing and in favour of a European social benefit scheme.  
Now moving on the Eurosceptic variables. Starting with the dichotomous variable that measure 
if the respondent would want their country to remain or leave the European Union. This variable 
in model 5, has the effect of 0.117 and is significant. This indicate that those that want their 
country to remain in the union are also positive towards a European Union welfare scheme, 
than those who want to leave. This is not very surprising, and this connection is confirmed by 
the next variable that asks the respondent if the European unification has gone too far or if it 
should go further. This variable has an effect of 0.032 and it is significant. This effect may not 
look as much, but it should also be taken into account that the dependent variable only has four 
steps. This effect is rather stable and is only changed to a slightly increase in the last model 
(0.033). What we can say about these two variables is that they have a large effect on especially 
the welfare index.  
7.1. Hypothesis 1. Welfare index 
The first hypothesis was that there would be a negative relationship between having the 
perception that the national welfare is doing good and being in favour of a European welfare 
state. With regard to the previous research, the hypothesis was two folded. The theory of 
benchmarking means that the national welfare would serve as a reference for people when they 
form their opinion about the European Union. The higher the bar, or the better the reference, 
the harder it will be for EU to compete in the same domains. But, still the hypothesis landed in 
that, with regard to benchmarking and the previous research concerning welfare and attitudes 
towards European integration, that those with a high perception of their national welfare would 
be more or less negative towards a common welfare scheme at a European level. Due to the 
insignificant result, there cannot be drawn any conclusion regarding the effect of the welfare 
index on the attitudes toward a European Union welfare scheme.  
7.2. Hypothesis 2. Personal resources/ egocentric utilitarianism  
The second hypothesis was that there would be a positive relationship of scoring high on the 
demographic variables that constitutes egocentric utilitarianism, personal resources. One thing 
that need to be cleared out is that the dichotomous variable “unemployed” have the reversed 
code with reference to the other two variables “education” and “income”, which means that 
scoring high on education and income means that you have more education and a higher 
income, whereas scoring “high” or 1 instead of 0 on the unemployed variable means that you 
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are unemployed. With that said we can see that the hypothesis turned out to be wrong, at least 
regarding the income variable. First of all, the variable “medium education” in uninterpretable 
since it is not significant in any of the models, not when tested by itself and nor when tested 
when controlled for European integration. The same can be said for high education. This means 
that it cannot be drawn any conclusions on the effects of education. Turning to income, the 
effect is negative, meaning that the higher income you have (classified into the deciles) the 
more negative you are towards a welfare scheme. The effect is small but significant. The small 
effect could be an effect of the fact that the dependent variable has only four steps. As gone 
through in the theory section, European integration have historically been two folded. The old 
definition that has been along for the longest period, is mainly economic integration. With that 
said, it makes sense that those that have high education and high income and have a job are not 
genuinely positive to welfare. But the hypothesis is based on the vast literature about European 
integration. Looking at the last variable “unemployment”, the effect is rather small and positive. 
Since this variable is reversed from the others, could be the explanation to why it is positive. If 
you are unemployed you need the welfare state and therefore it makes sense that you are also 
positive towards welfare at a European. When testing this variable on its own, together with 
“education” and “income” the effect is significant, meaning that we can draw a conclusion that 
being unemployed meaning that you are in favour of a European welfare scheme.  
7.3. Hypothesis 3. Ideology 
The third hypothesis was to test if being ideologically right had a negative effect on being in 
favour of a European welfare scheme. The variable was recoded the variable from an interval 
scale where 0 is equal to left and 10 is equal to right, into a dummy variable with the categories 
left, middle and right. The variable was significant and the conclusion that can be drawn is that 
there is a very strong relationship with being ideologically right wing and also negative towards 
a European Union wide welfare scheme, which means that hypothesis 3 was correct.  
7.4. Hypothesis 4. European integration 
Turning to the third hypothesis. This hypothesis was that there would be a positive relationship 
with being in favour of European integration and be in favour of a European welfare scheme. 
These variables are very related, obviously. The variables that measure European integration 
are one dichotomous variable that simply asks if people would want their country to remain or 
secede from the EU. 0 is secede and 1 is remain. The second variable ranges from 0 – 10, where 
0 is equal to not in favour of further European integration and 10 is equal to wanting European 
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integration should go further. Both these variables are positive (especially the dichotomous EU-
membership variable) and they also turn out to have a strong effect on the other two variable 
clusters, in the first design where these to serve as control variables. They make the welfare 
satisfaction index and the demographic variable turn significant. This hypothesis is supported 
by a large marginal.  
 
7.5. Model 9 
Now looking at the full model, where all variables are included. Something that turned out is 
that the dummy variable for high education increases largely and turns significant (-0.054). 
Another thing that can be observed is that the unemployment variable turns insignificant, 
though the effect changes very little. The ideology variable decreases a little (-0.137) but stays 
significant, which gives support to the hypothesis. The two Euroscepticism variables do not 
change to a large extent and both of them stays significant.  
When running the full model in an ordinary least squares regression, with the countries 
clustered, it can be observed that the r-square of the full model is 0.0716, 7,16%. This indicates 
that 7,16% of the variance can be explained by the model.  
 
7.6. Interaction term 
As could be observed as has been mentioned several times in the thesis is that the explanation 
of Euroscepticism seems to have a very strong effect on the other variables in the other three 
models. To investigate the relationship and see if European unification has a moderation effect 
on the relationship between satisfaction of the welfare and being in favour or against a European 
welfare scheme. For that matter, the index and the 10-step scale variable that measure the 
attitudes towards European unification has been remade into an interaction variable. In the full 
model where European Unification is controlling the index variable, the coefficient for the 
index shows the increase when the other variables are equal to zero. The coefficient for 
European Unification shows the increase when all other variables is equal to zero. And for this 
reason, the interaction term shows the increase of the coefficient of the index as a result of one 
unit increase of the variable of European unification.  
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The results are presented in table 2. This table shows the results of the interaction term together 
with the welfare index and the European unification variable, along with the last model, which 
tests the variables all together, including the interaction term. 
Table 2. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is if the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from a 
multilevel OLS regression with an interaction term of the welfare index and European 
unification.  
 
Multilevel regression, Index, European Unification and the interaction term 
European Union welfare scheme 
 Model 1 Full model 
Index -.059*** 
(.016) 
-.058*** 
(.016) 
Medium education  -.016 
(.019) 
High education  -.055* 
(.027) 
Income  -.011* 
(.005) 
Unemployment  .051 
(.03) 
Ideologically right 
 
 -.138*** 
(.034) 
European Union member  .140*** 
(.025) 
European Unification .001 
(.019) 
-.009 
(.019) 
Interaction term .007** 
(.003) 
.008** 
(.002) 
Gender .029 
(.016) 
.017 
(.013) 
Age -.005* 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.003) 
Age squared .000* 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
Intercept 2.950*** 
(.137) 
2.935*** 
(.122) 
N. Observation 18,762 18,762 
N. Countries 16 16 
Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels *<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001.. The standard error is in parenthesis. 
The data is weighted, and the countries are clustered into a multilevel model, with regard to the fact that the 
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answers is nested at level-2 (country level). The interaction term “indexunification” is made out of the welfare 
index and the variables that measures European unification.   
 
As can be observed in the table above, the interaction variable proved to have a strong effect 
on the index as could be suspected in the original table. In the original table, the variable of the 
index turned much stronger and also became significant. With this interaction variable, the 
effect of the index turned even stronger. What is interesting is that the variable that measure 
European unification, itself turned very weak and insignificant. The interaction term itself also 
turned out to have a weak effect. The conclusion that can be drawn here is that the strong effect 
of the European unification variable seems to be false, though both variables proved the 
hypothesis. But what is observed here is that it mainly has had a moderation effect in satisfaction 
with the index. 
7.8. Relationship between the models 
The following table explore the relationship with the different models. In the first table, each 
hypothesis was tested individually, both with and without the three control variables gender, 
age and country. The following tables will explore the variables by controlling the independent 
variables by using the variables from the other hypothesises as control variables. Each table 
will include the control variables gender and age.  
 
7.9. Welfare index 
The following results are presented in table 3. This table shows the results of the welfare index 
when it is controlled by the variables that measure European integration. 
Table 3. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is if the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from a 
multilevel OLS regression.  
 
Multilevel Regression – Index, controlled by Euroscepticism  
EU social benefit scheme 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Index -.006 
(.008) 
-.018* 
(.008) 
-.025** 
(.008) 
-.026** 
(.008) 
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EU-membership  .206*** 
(.036) 
.13*** 
(.028) 
.127*** 
(.028) 
European Unification   .034** 
(.010) 
.034** 
(.010) 
Gender    .025 
(.016) 
Age     -.005* 
(.002) 
Age squared    .000* 
(.000) 
Intercept 2.769*** 
(.091) 
2.665*** 
(.094) 
2.592*** 
(.103) 
2.705*** 
(.112) 
N. Observations 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 
N.countries 16 16 16 16 
Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels: *<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001. The standard error is in parenthesis. 
The data is weighted, and the countries are clustered into a multilevel model, with regard to the fact that the 
answers is nested at level-2 (country level).  
 
To further explore the relationship between the welfare index, which to repeat, is an index 
consisting of five variables that measures how satisfied the respondent is with its nation’s 
welfare, including satisfaction with the state of the economy. This table above investigates the 
index without the variables that measure egocentric utilitarianism, in order to see if there is any 
difference. Looking at the first model, it can be seen that the effect for the index is the same as 
for the two previous models (0.006). The effect is also insignificant. With this said, no 
conclusions can be drawn about satisfaction with the national welfare, without controlling for 
European integration. When introducing the first variable that measure European Union 
membership, we see a strong increase in the negative effect of the index variable, and that it 
turns significant. This effect is almost the same in the first as in this third design (0.014/0.018), 
the difference can be said to be because of the absence of the egocentric utilitarianism variables. 
The effect increases even more when introducing the variable that measure European 
unification and show a very small increase when introducing the two last control variable, 
gender and age.  
 
7.10. Personal resources/ Egocentric utilitarianism 
The following results are presented in table 4. This table shows the results of the self-interest 
variables when controlled by the welfare index and the European integration variables.  
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Table 4. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is if the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from a 
multilevel OLS regression.  
 
Multilevel Regression – Egocentric utilitarianism, controlled for by the index, Euroscepticism, age and 
gender.  
EU social benefit scheme 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Medium education -.010 
(.02) 
-.010 
(.02) 
-.009 
(.02) 
-.017 
(.019) 
-.015 
(.018) 
-.017 
(.020) 
High education -.013 
(.032) 
-.012 
(.032) 
-.013 
(.031) 
-.037 
(.030) 
-.050 
(.029) 
-.054* 
(.027) 
Income -.011* 
(.005) 
-.011* 
(.005) 
-.011* 
(.005) 
-.013** 
(.005) 
-.013** 
(.005) 
-.013** 
(.005) 
Unemployement .06* 
(.029) 
.059* 
(.028) 
.055* 
(.027) 
.065* 
(.032) 
.063 
(.033) 
.058 
(.032) 
Index  -.003 
(.009) 
-.004 
(.009) 
   
EU-membership    .21*** 
(.036) 
.132*** 
(.026) 
.130*** 
(.026) 
European Unification     .033** .033** 
(.01) 
Gender   .029 
(.015) 
  .026 
(.014) 
Age   -.005 
(.003) 
  -.002 
(.003) 
Age squared   .000 
(.000) 
  .000 
(.000) 
Intercept 2.808** 
(.058) 
2.821*** 
(.077) 
2.947*** 
(.087) 
2.659*** 
(.074) 
2.552*** 
(.094) 
2.600*** 
(.107) 
N. Observations 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 
N.countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels: *<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001. The standard error is in parenthesis. 
The data is weighted, and the countries are clustered into a multilevel model, with regard to the fact that the 
answers is nested at level-2 (country level).  
Now, looking at the variables that measure personal resources (education, income and 
unemployment). The difference in this design is to have these three variable as independent 
variables, rather than control variables for the index. Though, the order of the variables will 
make income and unemployment control variable to education. Though with that said, we can 
see the dummy variable medium education is still insignificant throughout the design. 
Interestingly, high education remains insignificant throughout the entire design, except when 
the control variables gender and age are introduced. It is insignificant even though the European 
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integration variables are introduced, even though they contribute to increase the effect of both 
medium and high education. Turning to income. What can be said here is that it is significant, 
though not very strong in any of the designs. The effect of income in this design is more or less 
the same as in the previous designs. The same can be said, turning to unemployment. The effect 
differs between 0.06 and 0.055, when the index is included and controlled for.  
7.11. Ideology, left – right 
The following results are presented in table 6. This table shows the results of the ideology 
variable when it is controlled for by the welfare index, personal resources variables and the 
European integration variables.  
Table 5. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is if the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from a 
multilevel OLS regression.  
 
Multilevel Regression – Ideology 
EU social benefit scheme 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Ideologically right -.160*** 
(.037) 
-.158*** 
(.037) 
-.156*** 
(.035) 
-.154*** 
(.034) 
-.150*** 
(.035) 
-.149*** 
(.035) 
Index -.000 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.009) 
    
Medium Education   -.013 
(.019) 
-.01 
(.019) 
  
High education   -.019 
(.032) 
-.016 
(.030) 
  
Income   -.01* 
(.004) 
-.009* 
(.004) 
  
Unemployment   .053 
(.029) 
.052 
(.028) 
  
EU-member     .114*** 
(.025) 
.111*** 
(.025) 
European unification     .032** 
(.01) 
.031** 
(.01) 
Gender  .025 
(.015) 
 .022 
(.013) 
 .022 
(.014) 
Age  -.007* 
(.003) 
 -.005 
(.003) 
 -.004 
(.002) 
Age squared  .000* 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
 .000* 
(.000) 
Intercept 2.782*** 
(.088) 
2.929*** 
(.097) 
2.843*** 
(.054) 
2.958*** 
(.066) 
2.521*** 
(.103) 
2.61*** 
(.112) 
N. Observations 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 
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N.countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels: *<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001.. The standard error is in parenthesis. 
The data is weighted, and the countries are clustered into a multilevel model, with regard to the fact that the 
answers is nested at level-2 (country level).  
 
7.12. European integration 
The following results are presented in table 5. This table shows the results of the European 
integration when it is controlled for by the self-interest variables and the welfare index.  
Table 6. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from a multilevel 
OLS regression.  
 
Multilevel Regression – European Unification 
EU social benefit scheme 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
EU-membership .21*** 
(.036) 
 .132*** 
(.026) 
.130*** 
(.026) 
.13*** 
(.028) 
.127*** 
(.028) 
European unification  .040*** 
(.010) 
.033** 
(.01) 
.033** 
(.01) 
.034** 
(.010) 
.034** 
(.010) 
Medium education -.017 
(.019) 
-.011 
(.02) 
-.015 
(.018) 
-.017 
(.020) 
  
High education -.037 
(.030) 
-.04 
(.029) 
-.050 
(.029) 
-.054* 
(.027) 
  
Income -.013** 
(.005) 
-.012* 
(.005) 
-.013** 
(.005) 
-.013** 
(.005) 
  
Unemployment .065* 
(.032) 
.06 
(.031) 
.063 
(.033) 
.058 
(.032) 
  
Index     -.025** 
(.008) 
-.026** 
(.008) 
Gender    .026 
(.014) 
 .025 
(.016) 
Age    -.002 
(.003) 
 -.005* 
(.002) 
Age squared    .000 
(.000) 
 .000* 
(.000) 
Intercept 2.659*** 
(.074) 
2.612*** 
(.094) 
2.552*** 
(.094) 
2.600*** 
(.107) 
2.592*** 
(.103) 
2.705*** 
(.112) 
N. Observations 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 
N.countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 
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Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels *<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001. The standard error is in parenthesis. The 
data is weighted, and the countries are clustered into a multilevel model, with regard to the fact that the answers 
is nested at level-2 (country level).  
Now looking at the variables that measure European integration. These variables should be 
payed attention two since they have proven in the previous designs to be the ones that for one, 
give the other variables a stronger effect and two, make them turn from insignificant to 
insignificant. In this design the variables are the ones that are independent. First there is the 
variable that asks the respondent if they would want their country to remain or secede from the 
EU and then there is the variable that asks the respondent if they think that European unification 
has gone too far or should go further. If we first look at the variable that asks if the respondent 
would want their country to remain or secede from the EU, the effect decreases largely when 
the variable that measure European unification is introduced. The pattern is the same in this 
design where education, income, unemployment and the index serve as control variables.  
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8. Analysis 
There are some things that can be seen from these results. The research question was to 
investigate and analyse potential explanations that European voters have towards a common 
welfare scheme. The reason behind the research problem is the fact that the social dimension 
has gained land during the years and especially since the pillars of the social rights was signed 
by the European leaders at the High level meeting in Gothenburg in 2017. The social dimension 
has gotten attention in the newly elected Commission under the lead od Ursula von der Layen.  
In the research overview, it was clear that there was a large amount of research concerning 
European integration. Many of the authors that have gone through this have used the dataset 
from the Eurobarometer, from different waves. As been mentioned, there are obvious problems 
with validity about a variable that only measures European integration. Not much of the 
previous research has asked the question about attitudes that European voters have towards a 
European welfare scheme. One of the hypotheses that was to examine this question, was 
benchmarking. Europe and the EU include many states. Each state has their own welfare 
regime. Each state has their own way running a public economy and the public finances. This 
means that when European voters decide what their opinions towards a European welfare will 
be, they will first look at their national welfare and what they think about it. The hypothesis 
was that if you are satisfied with your country’s domestic welfare, you would be negative 
towards a European welfare scheme. Why? Because the national welfare constitutes a reference. 
The better the reference, the harder it will be for a competing welfare scheme. The same logic 
works in a reversed way. The more negative you are with your country’s welfare, the more you 
would be in favour of a European welfare scheme. The reasons why are several, for example 
the European welfare scheme could serve as a replacement if the national standards do not live 
up to your satisfaction. Hypothesis one did not include variables that measures how generous 
welfare states are and if that could be determinant in forming attitudes towards a European 
welfare scheme, since it is a completely different aspect. Those that live in states with generous 
welfare do not necessarily have to be satisfied with what it actually delivers. However, this 
hypothesis could be directly answered. The five variables that in this thesis constitutes the 
satisfaction of welfare were put together as an index. The idea with this index was to catch all 
aspects of the welfare: Unemployment, pensioners, education, health services and economy. 
This index turned out to be insignificant and therefore it cannot be drawn any conclusions if 
those that are satisfied with their welfare also are negative towards a European Union welfare 
scheme. The index turned significant when the two variables that measure Euroscepticism were 
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introduced, and for that reason the conclusion is that satisfaction is very conditioned by the 
opinions towards European integration. This relationship was further tested by including an 
interaction term, where the result showed that the effect of the index was increased and the 
variable that measure European Unification became insignificant. However, the best 
explanation, due to the results, was found in the European integration hypothesis. Satisfaction 
with the national welfare appear to be of less importance, and instead people that are opposed 
to European integration are also opposed to an EU welfare scheme. Those that are Eurosceptic 
will be so, even if they are or if they are not satisfied with their national welfare. Another 
conclusion can also be drawn from the “non-answer” when it comes to measure the satisfaction 
with the national welfare. This measurement is very broad. Of course, there are much deeper 
questions to ask, in all five areas. Though this gives a hint, but one would think it would be 
possible to make indexes for each of the respective five areas of satisfaction, and perhaps get a 
more precise measurement of satisfaction with national welfare.  
To analyse the second hypothesis, the hypothesis was that those who score high on education, 
income and have a job would also be more positive towards a European welfare scheme. This 
seems somewhat contradictive since those that are “privileged” would not by first thought to 
care for welfare. This hypothesis was formed with regard to the previous research. There is 
much literature about the factors that forms opinions towards European integration. The word 
of contradiction is “integration” as previously stated, integration has had two meanings 
throughout the history of the European Union. The first and oldest meaning of the term is 
economic integration, for example simpler treading rules, common currency and free access to 
the internal market. However, the second meaning of the word, which has gained importance 
during the recent years not least, is the meaning of political integration. Political integration 
where more and more areas of policy is put at the European Commission, so as the social policy 
area, which have been, and is still a matter of national competence for the most part. With that 
said, the previous research guided the hypothesis and it proved to be wrong. Education was 
tested by making a variable that captured low education, medium education and high education. 
As the results showed, the variables of both medium and high education were insignificant and 
therefore there cannot be drawn any conclusions is education has an effect of the attitudes 
towards a common European welfare scheme. Income however had a negative effect and 
proved significant even without controlling for Euroscepticism. This indicates that those with 
high income are not in favour of a common welfare scheme at an EU level. As mentioned, it is 
not surprising to see the reason to that since those with high income are not the ones to be likely 
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to be in need of the welfare, even though the hypothesis said otherwise. The variable that 
measure unemployment turned out to be significant and turned insignificant when the 
Euroscepticism variables were included. This indicates that the those who are unemployed are 
more in favour of a European welfare scheme, which also contradicts the hypothesis, that said 
that those who are well off are the ones that are most in favour of a common welfare scheme.  
The ideology variable turned out to be strong and significant. The conclusions that can be drawn 
is that those that define themselves as ideologically right, are negative towards a European 
welfare scheme.  
Looking at the variables that measure Euroscepticism. We can see both the variables showed 
positive and significant effects. The conclusion is that those that hold Eurosceptic opinions are 
also opposed to a European social benefit scheme. This is not very surprising, but what need to 
be said is that these variables contribute to make other variables significant. This is a sign that 
the hypothesis of Euroscepticism is the main hypothesis that predicts the other ones.  
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9. Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis was to analyse attitudes towards a European welfare scheme. Starting in 
the high-level meeting in Gothenburg, where the leaders of the European Union committed to 
the document of the Pillar of social rights, a document with 20 principles that involved workers’ 
rights and rights to basic health care services. The social dimension was also one of the six 
principles of the at the time the nominated leader of the European Commission, Ursula von der 
Leyen.  
The social dimension of the EU has grown in content since the 1980s, very much due to the 
fact that new member states in the European community entered, states which did not have the 
same economic prerequisites. The research question for this thesis was to analyse which 
attitudes European voters have towards a common social benefit scheme. What do these 
attitudes depend on? If decision and policy makers understand the attitudes in a field of policy, 
they also understand how to design it and what mandate they have to design policies.  
There is a vast field of previous research in this field of research. Much of the research has been 
done with regard to European integration. Not much research has been done in the field of 
welfare, and that is where this thesis fills a proper research gap. Yes, there is a study that was 
done in the 90s about welfare attitudes, and yes there is a study that was made about the Belgian 
electorate. But there is no study in recent years, in which several European Union countries and 
their citizens are included. The two major fields of attitudes have been researched are 
benchmarking and personal resources, as independent variables. Personal resources, which is 
used in this thesis, is a term that previous researchers have used and describes certain 
demographic variables. In this thesis, the term personal resources has been manifested in 
education, income, and unemployment. These three variables have been used in the previous 
research and therefore they are used in this thesis as well. Ideology was also one aspect that 
was gone through in the previous research.  
Benchmarking means that voters use references when they drop their judgement about 
something. In this case the reference was the national welfare and the object of opinion was a 
European Union wide welfare scheme. Egocentric utilitarianism/ personal resources is 
basically how well-off people are in terms of education, income and employment.  
The previous research and theory resulted in four hypothesises, each investigates the different 
explanations of the attitudes towards a European welfare scheme. The hypothesises purpose is 
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to answer the research question of the best explanations to the attitudes towards a European 
welfare scheme.  
The method and design of this thesis has been a multilevel regression. This was decided after 
making the variance test, to test whether multilevel or cluster the country variable was the better 
design. The data that has been used is the European social survey round 8. The design of the 
thesis has been to test each hypothesis independently, and lastly to include all variable in one 
model. Each variable has been recoded so that the non-answers, don’t know answers and 
refusals have been recoded away. The data has been weighted, with regard to the different size 
of the populations in the different countries and the different opportunities to take part in the 
survey between different countries. The logic behind choosing the dataset is that it includes all 
the relevant variables.  
The results of the thesis are that the explanation of Euroscepticism is the best to explain the 
attitudes to the European welfare scheme. Euroscepticism that in this thesis is manifested with 
the variables that measures European unification at a 10-step interval scale and also if people 
would want their country to remain or secede from the EU. These two variables prove to be the 
strongest explanations since they make the other variables become significant. This in turn 
indicates that the question of a European welfare scheme is mainly seen as a further integration 
process and not primarily as a question of welfare.  
For future research, more focus needs to be made to these different explanations. The question 
of European welfare and the social pillar is likely to increase in importance in the coming year. 
To investigate the theory of benchmarking, there would be a good idea to use data that further 
explore what people think about their own welfare. This thesis tried to conceptualize what 
people think of their own welfare, but it is very broad.  
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11. Appendix 
Table 7. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is if the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from an 
ordinary least squares regression.  
 
OLS Regression 
EU social benefit scheme 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Index -.066*** 
(.004) 
-.065*** 
(.004) 
-.063*** 
(.004) 
-.063*** 
(.004) 
-.063*** 
(.004) 
-.073*** 
(.004) 
-.078*** 
(.004) 
-.078*** 
(.004) 
-.078*** 
(.004) 
Medium education  -.084*** 
(.014) 
-.072*** 
(.014) 
-.073*** 
(.014) 
-.072*** 
(.014) 
-.073*** 
(.014) 
-.066*** 
(.014) 
-.067*** 
(.014) 
-.077*** 
(.014) 
High education  -.061*** 
(.016) 
-.036* 
(.017) 
-.036* 
(.017) 
-.036* 
(.017) 
-.068*** 
(.017) 
-.081*** 
(.017) 
-.083*** 
(.017) 
-.094*** 
(.017) 
Income   -.009*** 
(.002) 
-.008** 
(.002) 
-.008* 
(.002) 
-.010*** 
(.002) 
-.011*** 
(.002) 
-.011*** 
(.002) 
-.013*** 
(.002) 
Unemployed    .108*** 
(.023) 
.109*** 
(.023) 
.115*** 
(.023) 
.109*** 
(.023) 
.110*** 
(.023) 
.093*** 
(.023) 
Ideologically middle     -.023* 
(.011) 
.028* 
(.011) 
-.024* 
(.011) 
-.024* 
(.011) 
-.027* 
(.011) 
European Union member      .329*** 
(.014) 
.22*** 
(.015) 
.218*** 
(.015) 
.219*** 
(.015) 
European integration       .045*** 
(.002) 
.045*** 
(.002) 
.044331
2*** 
(.002) 
Gender        .025* 
(.011) 
.025* 
(.011) 
Age         .001 
(.002) 
Age squeared         -.000 
(.000) 
Intercept 3.053*** 
(.021) 
3.105**
* 
(.022) 
3.136*** 
(.023) 
3.116*** 
(.024) 
3.127*** 
(.024) 
2.944*** 
(.025) 
2.835*** 
(.026) 
2.819*** 
(.026) 
2.863*** 
(.049) 
N observation 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 
Adjusted R2 0.0179 0.0197 0.0205 0.0216 0.0218 0.0497 0.0700 0.0702 0.0710 
Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels *<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001.. The standard error is in parenthesis.  
 
Table 8. Attitudes towards a common European welfare scheme. The dependent variable 
is if the respondent is in favour of a European welfare scheme. Coefficients from an 
ordinary least squares regression with the countries clustered.  
 
OLS Regression, countries clustered 
EU social benefit scheme 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Index -.066** 
(.019) 
-.065** 
(.018) 
-.063** 
(.019) 
-.063** 
(.019) 
-.063** 
(.019) 
-.073** 
(.017) 
-.078*** 
(.016) 
-.078*** 
(.016) 
-.078*** 
(.016) 
Medium education  -.084 
(.041) 
-.072 
(.042) 
-.073 
(.041) 
-.072 
(.041) 
-.073 
(.038) 
-.066 
(.035) 
-.067 
(.035) 
-.077 
(.037) 
High education  -.061 
(.041) 
-.036 
(.036) 
-.036 
(.036) 
-.036 
(.036) 
-.068 
(.033) 
-.081* 
(.031) 
-.083* 
(.031) 
-.094** 
(.032) 
Income   -.009 
(.007) 
-.008 
(.008) 
-.008 
(.008) 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.011 
(.007) 
-.011 
(.007) 
-.013 
(.008) 
Unemployed    .108** 
(.035) 
.109** 
(.036) 
.115** 
(.033) 
.109** 
(.032) 
.110** 
(.032) 
.093** 
(.031) 
Ideologically middle     -.023 
(.031) 
-.028 
(.031) 
-.024 
(.029) 
-.024 
(.029) 
-.027 
(.028) 
European Union member      .329*** 
(.031) 
.22*** 
(.026) 
.218*** 
(.027) 
.219*** 
(.027) 
European integration       .045** 
(.011) 
.045** 
(.011) 
.044** 
(.011) 
Gender        .025 
(.014) 
.025 
(.014) 
Age         .001 
(.003) 
Age squeared         -.000 
(.000) 
Intercept 3.053*** 
(.127) 
3.105*** 
(.123) 
3.135**
* 
(.112) 
3.116*** 
(.11) 
3.127*** 
(.112) 
2.944*** 
(.102) 
2.835*** 
(.098) 
2.819*** 
(.101) 
2.863*** 
(.107) 
N observation 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 18,762 
R2 0.0179 0.0198 0.0208 0.0219 0.0221 0.0501 0.0704 0.0706 0.0716 
Comment: ESS8, 2016. Significance levels *<0.05 **< 0.01 ***<0.001.. The standard error is in parenthesis. 
The countries are clustered.  
 
 
 
